As one of China’s fundamental governance mechanisms, the policy pilot system has been integrated into the broader national strategy for modernizing state governance. From the perspective of vertical-horizontal relations, this study takes the municipal-level social governance modernization pilot in Sichuan Province as an empirical case to reveal the logic and mechanisms of benchmark competition in local governance.The study finds that the municipal pilot program has shifted from the traditional “apply first, accept and award later”model to a new approach of “construct first, apply later.”Evaluation criteria now include not only the absolute performance improvements before and after policy implementation in each locality, but also comparative performance across peer jurisdictions,thereby forming a competitive framework to identify qualified pilot sites.The mechanism involves the following elements:The Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission establishes institutional frameworks through benchmark-setting, incentive-driven competition, and relative ranking systems, while local governments achieve effective adoption and dynamic adaptation of central governance objectives through top-down mobilization,bottom-up coordination, and differentiated operational approaches.The concept of benchmark competition offers a novel theoretical lens for understanding the internal logic of China’s policy pilot system. It helps reduce information asymmetries between upper- and lower-level governments, mitigates the institutional fragmentation caused by vertical-horizontal divides, and contributes to the formation of localized governance experiences under therubric of “governing the city to govern the country.”
XIE Xiaoqin
,
XU Jie
. Benchmark competition: A new mechanism for the pilot policy of modernization of urban governance: An analysis based on the perspective of block relations[J]. Urban Problems, 2025
, 358(5)
: 4
-14
.
DOI: 10.13239/j.bjsshkxy.cswt.250501
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