The central-local relationship has always been the focus of research on territorial spatial governance, but existing studies have focused on exploring the antagonistic dichotomy between the central and the local, neglecting the behavioral mechanisms of provincial governments in the synergy of central-local games. Based on the perspective of principal-agent and soft budget constraint theory, this paper innovatively constructs a systematic framework of “three stages + three levels” to analyze the “two-way soft constraint” vertical inter-governmental interaction mechanism of provincial governments in territorial spatial governance from the perspective of provincial governments’ behaviors. By tracking the implementation of land binding quota policy in Province F, it is found that the upward and downward soft constraint behaviors at the provincial level affect the implementation of the quota policy through target adaptation and autonomous power expansion, respectively, and that when the central government adopts an institutional design that decentralizes land control and strengthens accountability constraints, it helps to push provincial governments to play a coordinating role in the central-local relationship. In response to this, reforms in territorial space governance should be promoted through selective centralization, institutionalized decentralization, and improvements in the governance capability of provincial government.
WANG Chen-yue
,
YE Yu-min
,
SHAN Jing-jing
. Provincial governments‘ vertical inter - governmental interaction mechanism in territorial spatial governance: A case study based on the implementation process of land binding quota in Province F[J]. Urban Problems, 2025
, 358(5)
: 46
-55
.
DOI: 10.13239/j.bjsshkxy.cswt.250505
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